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State-Mandated Disability Insurance as Salve to the 
Consumer Bankruptcy Imbroglio 
Alena Allen 
From Main Street to Wall Street, Americans are hurting. In 2009, 
over 1.4 million families filed for bankruptcy. Researchers examining 
the causes of bankruptcy discovered that as many as sixty-two percent of 
all bankruptcies were precipitated by a medical crisis. Because many 
Americans are living paycheck to paycheck and lack disability 
insurance, when a medical crisis strikes, bank accounts are quickly 
depleted by the amalgam of high medical bills and lost wages. Disability 
insurance provides needed wage replacement when a worker is unable to 
work due to an illness or injury. This Article presents the case for state-
mandated disability insurance as a solution for combating the rising 
number of consumer bankruptcies. It describes the prevalence of medical 
bankruptcies and the impact of disabilities on American families as 
well as the most commonly available substitutes for comprehensive 
disability insurance and explains why these substitutes do not provide 
workers with adequate wage protection. Then, this Article presents state-
mandated disability insurance as a solution to the medical bankruptcy 
imbroglio and provides statistical evidence demonstrating that states 
mandating disability insurance for most workers have on average a 
lower per capita bankruptcy rate than the national average. Finally, 
this Article argues that the best alternative for increasing access to 
disability insurance is for more states to mandate disability insurance, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A record 2.8 million American families received a foreclosure 
notice in 2009,1 and over 1.4 million families filed for bankruptcy.2 
Over 7.2 million jobs have been lost since the beginning of the Great 
Recession in 2007,3 and roughly 15.4 million Americans are 
unemployed.4 As startling as those statistics are, it is even more 
surprising that many American families report that it is not getting 
laid off from a job or having to downsize in the wake of a divorce 
that pushes them to brink of financial ruin; rather, it is a medical 
crisis.5 
Clearly, this phenomenon has not happened overnight. The 
American family has been struggling for years. Over the past two 
decades, an increasing portion of Americans have filed for 
bankruptcy.6 Bankruptcy filings in federal courts have risen 
dramatically.7 The total number of individual bankruptcy petitions 
 
 1. Foreclosure filings include default notices, scheduled foreclosure actions, and bank 
repossessions. See Lynn Adler, U.S. 2009 Foreclosures Shatter Record Despite Aid, REUTERS 
(Jan. 14, 2010, 10:30 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/14/us-usa-housing-
foreclosures-idUSTRE60D0LZ20100114 (noting that 2.8 million properties were foreclosed 
upon in 2009). 
 2. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Statistics 2009, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2009
/1209_f2.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2011). 
 3. See RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE 
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009) (discussing how large amounts of consumer debt coupled 
with the collapse of housing market triggered a devastating chain reaction). 
 4. Louis Uchitelle, In Surprise, Jobless Rate Fell to 10% in November, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
5, 2009, at A1. 
 5. See, e.g., David U. Himmelstein et al., Illness and Injury as Contributors to 
Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFF., Feb. 2, 2005, at w5-63, w5-66 to -68 (presenting a study detailing 
the medical causes of bankruptcy); Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debtor-Patient: In Search of Non-
Debt-Based Alternatives, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 453, 456–61 (2004); Melissa B. Jacoby et al., 
Rethinking the Debates over Health Care Financing: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 377, 386–91 (2001); Christopher Tarver Robertson et al., Get Sick, Get 
Out: The Medical Causes of Home Mortgage Foreclosures, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 65, 66 (2008). 
 6. Elizabeth Warren, The New Economics of the American Family, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. 
L. REV. 1, 27 (2004) (“More adults will file for bankruptcy than will be diagnosed with cancer. 
More people will file for bankruptcy than will graduate from college. And, in an era when 
traditionalists decry the demise of the institution of marriage, Americans will file more petitions 
for bankruptcy than for divorce.”); see also Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Young, Old, and In 
Between: Who Files for Bankruptcy?, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Sept. 2001, at 1–2. 
 7. There was a 31% increase in bankruptcy filings between 2007 and 2008. Admin. 
Office of the U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Filings Up in Calendar Year 2008, U.S. COURTS (Mar. 
05, 2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/09-03-05/Bankruptcy_Filings_ Up_ 
In_Calendar_Year_2008.aspx. 
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filed during the twelve-month period ending September 2009 
equaled 1,344,095,8 up from 1,004,342 individual bankruptcy 
petitions filed in fiscal year 20089 and 775,344 filed in 2007.10 
The current rate of bankruptcy filings, roughly 5900 per day, 
rivals the number of filings prior to the passage of the Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (“BAPCPA”).11 
BAPCPA12 was enacted in 2005 and was intended to address and 
prevent what was believed to be widespread bankruptcy abuse by 
consumers.13 The legislative history of BAPCPA illustrates that 
lawmakers believed that consumers were using bankruptcy “as a first 
resort, rather than a last resort” and taking advantage of loopholes in 
the 1978 Code.14 However, many bankruptcy scholars criticized 
BAPCPA for making it harder for working-class Americans to file for 
bankruptcy.15 Thus, the recent dramatic increase in filings despite the 
 
 8. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Statistics for Twelve-Month Period 
Ending Sept. 2009, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/ 
BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2009/0909_f2.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2011). 
 9. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Statistics for Twelve-Month Period 
Ending Sept. 2008, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics 
/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2008/0908_f2.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2011). 
 10. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Statistics for Twelve-Month Period 
Ending Sept. 2007, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/ 
BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2007/0907_f2.xls (last visited Aug. 25, 2011). 
 11. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
 12. BAPCPA was implemented at tremendous cost to taxpayers. It cost approximately 
$72.4 million for fiscal years 2005 through 2007 to implement the reform. U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-697, BANKRUPTCY REFORM: DOLLAR COSTS 
ASSOCIATED WITH THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 
ACT OF 2005, at 11 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08697.pdf. 
 13. Some bankruptcy experts have argued that widespread bankruptcy abuse was a myth 
and that BAPCPA was poorly drafted. See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, Means Testing: The Failed 
Bankruptcy Revolution of 2005, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 223, 227 (2007) (“BAPCPA 
adds a great amount of detail and is rife with bad draftsmanship, dumbfounding 
contradictions, and curious, even comical, special interest exceptions. It is hard to choke out 
any words of admiration for the quality of BAPCPA’s draftsmanship. Judges and scholars have 
not hesitated to pour scorn on Congress for the details of BAPCPA.”); Jean Braucher, A Fresh 
Start for Personal Bankruptcy Reform: The Need for Simplification and a Single Portal, 55 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1295, 1296 (2006) (noting that soon after BAPCPA’s enactment, bankruptcy 
experts began to refer to it by the fanciful acronym “BARF,” for “Bankruptcy Abuse 
Reduction Fiasco”). 
 14. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 4 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 90. 
 15. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card 
Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375 (2007) (arguing that the decrease in consumer debt discharge 
under the BAPCPA is unlikely to result in savings to credit card consumers); Henry J. 
Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing Consumers Under the “Bankruptcy 
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new hurdles imposed by BAPCPA is dramatic evidence of the 
financial crisis that is plaguing main streets all across America.16 
At the same time, the rate of home foreclosures has skyrocketed 
with a record spike in foreclosures in 2008.17 A total of 861,664 
families lost their homes to foreclosure in 2008.18 This means that 
one out of every fifty-four households received a foreclosure notice 
last year. The most common explanation for the rise in foreclosures 
has been that borrowers used interest-only loans and adjustable-rate 
mortgages to purchase homes that they could ill afford to buy.19 
Media pundits and analysts have also pointed their fingers at banks 
(for relaxing lending standards) and at aggressive practices by brokers 
as having contributed to the increase in nontraditional, fee-laden 
loans.20 Even traditionally straight-laced lenders like Citibank and 
 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,” 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191 (2005) 
(opining that the BAPCPA will make consumer bankruptcy more expensive, less effective, and 
in many cases inaccessible). 
 16. See Tara Siegel Bernard, Downturn Pushes More into Bankruptcy, Despite Tighter 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2009 at B1 (quoting president of a bankruptcy data and 
management company: “It shows you that a lot more people are hurting. . . . Even with the 
more restrictive law in place, the filings are back up to the prelaw level.”). 
 17. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, So Many Foreclosures, So Little Logic, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 5, 2009, at BU1 (“The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency said that among the 34 
million loans it tracks, foreclosures in progress . . . . [were] 73% higher than in the same period 
last year.”); E. Scott Reckard, State’s Mortgage Woes Forecast to Rise, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 
2009, at B2 (“[T]he percentage of California home loans that are delinquent at least 60 days 
or are in foreclosure is projected to skyrocket to more than 14% by year’s end from 9.7% as of 
June 30.”); Chris Reidy, Foreclosures Petitions Skyrocket, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 20, 2009, at B9 
(“[L]enders initiated 2,822 foreclosure proceedings against homeowners in Massachusetts [in 
July 2009], more than five times the 502 that were filed in July 2008.”); Les Christie, 
Foreclosures Up a Record 81% in 2008, CNNMONEY.COM (Jan. 15, 2009, 3:48 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/15/real_estate/ millions_in_foreclosure/index.htm. 
 18. Christie, supra note 17. 
 19. See, e.g., David Streitfeld, The House Trap, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2009, at B1 
(“Homeowners with interest-only loans have a much greater likelihood of default . . . . 
Nationally about 18 percent of prime interest-only loans are at least 60 days delinquent. In 
California, the level is even higher: 21 percent, a rate exceeded only in the other bubble states 
of Florida and Nevada.”); David Streitfeld, The Mortgage Meltdown: Foreclosure Pace Nears 
Decade High, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2007, at C1 (“Most of the loans going into default now 
were made at the peak of the housing boom in 2005, when some thought the good times 
would continue forever and lending standards were lax. Nearly 80% of loans made in the state 
in May 2005 for the purpose of purchasing houses had adjustable rates, a record high.”). 
 20. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 26, 2007, at B1 (“[P]otential borrowers were often led to high-cost and sometimes 
unfavorable loans that resulted in richer commissions for Countrywide’s smooth-talking sales 
force, outsize fees to company affiliates providing services on the loans, and a roaring stock 
price that made Countrywide executives among the highest paid in America.”). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 4:45 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1332 
Household reached settlement agreements after being sued for 
predatory lending.21 Thus, it is pretty clear that subprime loans and 
deceptive marketing practices contributed to the rise in the number 
of bankruptcy petitions and foreclosure filings. 
However, some have argued that the banks merely preyed on a 
culture of overconsumption. In particular, there is a popular view 
that Americans, particularly those living in the middle class, are 
suffering from “affluenza” or the insatiable need to overconsume 
and live beyond their means.22 Yet the view of the insatiable and 
irresponsible debtor has been debunked in recent studies. These 
studies have established a medical crisis, as mundane as it might 
seem, as being the key factor in the escalating foreclosure and 
bankruptcy rates. Just as important, other commentators have linked 
the rise in bankruptcies and foreclosures to increasing costs of 
medical treatments, care, and prescription drugs.23 Research has also 
shown that debtors who have filed for bankruptcy and people who 
have lost their homes in foreclosure often report that a medical crisis 
contributed to their predicament.24 
Although a handful of scholars have noted that greater 
utilization of disability insurance might reduce the number of 
bankruptcies,25 none have adequately addressed the connections 
 
 21. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, GAO-04-280, CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND 
STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING 4 (2004), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04280.pdf; Paule Beckett, Citigroup’s 
‘Subprime’ Reforms Questioned, WALL ST. J., July 18, 2002, at C1 (quoting a former loan 
officer who testified about how she marketed the mortgages: “If someone appeared 
uneducated, inarticulate, was a minority, or was particularly old or young, I would try to 
include all the [additional costs] CitiFinancial offered.”); Fed. Trade Comm’n, Citigroup 
Settles FTC Charges Against the Associates Record-Setting $215 Million for Subprime Lending 
Victims, FTC.GOV (Sept. 19, 2002), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/09/associates.shtm. 
 22. See JOHN DE GRAAF ET AL., AFFLUENZA: THE ALL-CONSUMING EPIDEMIC (2d. ed. 
2005). 
 23. See Melissa B. Jacoby & Elizabeth Warren, Beyond Hospital Misbehavior: An 
Alternative Account of Medical-Related Financial Distress, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 535, 538 
(2006) (discussing the consequences of incurring large medical bills, including wage 
garnishment, home liens, frozen bank accounts, and long-term payment plans with regularly-
compounded interest); see also Marsha Austin, Uninsured Pay Higher Price: Hospital Collection 
Agents Demand Full Cost of Care, DENVER POST, Jan. 28, 2003, at A-01 (reporting that 
hospitals in area had sued at least 210 individuals for unpaid medical bills of $2000 or more in 
the previous two years, with 24% of the cases involving bills of $10,000 or more). 
 24. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 25. See Adam Feibelman, Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer 
Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129 (2005) (discussing how forms of social 
insurance overlap and inviting scholars to explore the optimal relationship between consumer 
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between disability insurance and consumer bankruptcy,26 and 
proposals for how to expand access to disability insurance have thus 
far been inchoate. Disability insurance is an available mechanism for 
resolving the associated problems of injury, medical bills, and missed 
work, giving families just enough of a lifeline to allow them to avoid 
bankruptcy and foreclosure. This Article presents an argument for 
expanding disability insurance and demonstrates how access to 
disability insurance can be increased, allowing Americans to better 
prepare for and guard against the risk of a medical crisis. 
Part II of this Article defines the scope of the problem. Part III 
details the prevalence of disability in the United States and how 
incurring a disability or illness may lead to bankruptcy. Part IV 
discusses the common substitutes for disability insurance for most 
workers, namely, health insurance, Social Security, worker’s 
compensation programs, and retirement plans. As will be discussed, 
these sources of disability coverage for workers fail to replace income 
at adequate levels, exclude too many participants from coverage, and 
impose lengthy waiting periods, along with several other problems. 
Part V presents data supporting the theory that state-mandated 
disability insurance offers an effective solution to the medical 
bankruptcy imbroglio. Part VI presents a blueprint for designing 
effective state-mandated insurance schemes. Finally, Part VII 
provides a brief conclusion. 
II. THE MEDICAL BANKRUPTCY IMBROGLIO 
The majority of the research regarding the link between a 
medical crisis and bankruptcy has been pioneered by Elizabeth 
Warren and other scholars working on the Consumer Bankruptcy 
Project.27 The scholars of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project III 
 
bankruptcy and forms of social insurance including unemployment insurance, Medicare, 
disability insurance, and workers’ compensation); Jacoby, supra note 5, at 481 (“Because 
medical problems also can reduce one’s ability to work, high-income households also should 
consider purchasing disability insurance coverage, which is expensive but within reach for this 
segment of the population.”); Warren, supra note 6, at 38 (“Our federal disability system is 
geared toward those who will be out of work for a year or more. Families facing cancer, heart 
disease, diabetes, and many other diseases that may leave them with periods of debilitation but 
who may recover are left out of the system entirely. Whether change is to be accomplished by 
public or private means, the expansion of disability insurance to aid all workers who are struck 
with a serious disease should be on national agenda.”). 
 26. See Feibelman, supra note 25, at 134. 
 27. Consumer Bankruptcy Project I, in 1981, and Consumer Bankruptcy Project II, in 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 4:45 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1334 
conducted a national study in order to better understand why 
debtors file for bankruptcy. The researchers surveyed a random 
sample of 2314 debtors during early 2007 and examined their 
bankruptcy court records. In addition, they conducted extensive 
telephone interviews with 1032 of these bankruptcy filers.28 Their 
study was one of the first to illuminate the connection between a 
medical crisis and bankruptcy. 
According to the findings of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project, 
medical problems contributed to nearly two-thirds (sixty-two 
percent) of all bankruptcies in 2007.29 Between 2001 and 2007, the 
proportion of all bankruptcies attributable to medical problems rose 
by forty-nine percent.30 Particularly alarming was the finding that 
most of the debtors bankrupted by medical problems had health 
insurance. More than two-thirds were insured at the start of the 
bankrupting illness, including sixty percent who had private 
insurance coverage.31 The debtors with private insurance reported 
medical bills that averaged $17,749, versus $26,971 for the 
uninsured.32 Those debtors who initially had health insurance but 
lost coverage during the course of their illness had costs averaging 
$22,568.33 Most of the medically bankrupt were solidly middle-class 
before their medical crisis—half were homeowners and three-fifths 
had attended or graduated from college.34 Over the past two decades 
the number of families declaring bankruptcy after a serious illness has 
multiplied more than 2000%.35 Still, the most startling finding of the 
  
 
1991, were the work of Professors Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Lawrence 
Westrbook, all of whom have continued their work in Consumer Bankruptcy Project III, in 
2001. In addition, Professors David Himmelstein, Robert Lawless, Bruce Markell, Michael 
Schill, Susan Wachter, and Steffie Wollhander have shared in the design and development of 
the 2001 study. 
 28. See David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: 
Results of a National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 741–46 (2009), available at 
http://www.pnhp.org/new_bankruptcy_study/Bankruptcy-2009.pdf. 
 29. Himmelstein, supra note 28, at 743. 
 30. Id. at 744. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 743. 
 35. Warren, supra note 6, at 37. 
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Consumer Bankruptcy Project is that having health insurance does 
not insulate a family from the risk of having to file bankruptcy as a 
result of medical bills.36 
While some debtors lost their health insurance because they were 
unable to afford the premiums, some maintained their health 
insurance coverage throughout the medical crisis yet still could not 
afford to pay their medical bills.37 In either scenario, the result is the 
same: the family ends up in bankruptcy court.38 An illness or accident 
leads to missing work, followed by missed wages, job loss, and 
financial collapse. 
The findings of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project were similar 
to the results obtained by Robertson, Egelhof, and Hoke (the 
“Robertson Study”). The principal investigators in the Robertson 
Study sought to understand the causes of home foreclosure by 
conducting a survey of homeowners on the brink of foreclosure who 
had (allegedly) defaulted on their loans and had their lenders initiate 
foreclosure proceedings against them.39 
In the Robertson Study, nearly half of the respondents (49%) 
indicated that medical problems in part caused their foreclosure.40 
The investigators also examined objective indicia of medical 
disruptions in the two years prior to foreclosure, “including those 
respondents paying more than $2000 of medical bills out of pocket 
(37%), those losing two or more weeks of work because of injury or 
 
 36. See generally, Kevin Sack, From the Hospital Room to Bankruptcy Court, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 25, 2009, at A1 (discussing the rise in medical bankruptcies and high out-of-pocket 
costs). 
 37. See Jessica H. May & Peter J. Cunningham, Tough Trade-Offs: Medical Bills, Family 
Finances, and Access to Care, CENTER FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, June 2004, at 1, 
available at http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/689/689.pdf (finding about 43 million 
people have medical debt problems even though about two-thirds have insurance). 
 38. The work of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project is not without critics. See, e.g., Scott 
Fay et al., The Household Bankruptcy Decision, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 706, 714 (2002) (finding 
that health problems were not a statistically significant factor in bankruptcy filings.); Todd J. 
Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1463, 
1518 (2005) (“[A] recent study concludes that approximately half of consumer bankruptcies 
are caused by medical problems, a twenty-three-fold increase over a twenty-year period. Both 
conclusions are fundamentally unsupportable, however, and rest primarily on the way in which 
the researchers define and count what constitutes a medical bankruptcy rather than an actual 
increase in the number of bankruptcies caused by medical problems.”). 
 39. See Robertson et al., supra note 5, at 68. 
 40. Id. (stating that medical problems included “illness or injuries (32%), unmanageable 
medical bills (23%), lost work due to a medical problem (27%), or caring for sick family 
members (14%)”). 
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illness (30%), those currently disabled and unable to work (8%), and 
those who used their home equity to pay medical bills (13%).”41 
Ultimately, about seven in ten of the “respondents either self-
reported a medical cause of foreclosure” or experienced one of the 
above indicia of medical disruptions in the two years before 
foreclosure.42 “In many cases, homeowners were hit with a perfect 
storm of factors—a few thousand dollars of medical bills, a few weeks 
of missed work . . . [and a] rising interest rate—all combined to push 
them over the edge into foreclosure.”43 
In order to weather the perfect storm, or even a mild one, 
individuals and families need personal savings and social safety nets. 
Thirty years ago, the average family saved about 11 % of their take 
home pay. In contrast, during the housing boom, some experts 
claimed that the average savings rate had dropped to negative one 
percent due in large part to Americans tapping their home equity 
and other easy lines of credit.44 In May 2009, the Commerce 
Department reported that the rate of personal savings as a 
percentage of disposable income for that month had increased to 
6.9%, the highest levels since 1993,45 but by August 2009, the rate 
had dropped to 3.0%.46 The sharp momentary spike in the personal 
savings rate in early 2009 suggests that Americans were trying to use 
stimulus money to build a buffer against the threat of job losses 
during the recession. However, most were unable to maintain such a 
high rate of savings because so many Americans were living paycheck 
to paycheck.47 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 68–69. 
 44. See Warren, supra note 6, at 10 (2004) (citing SMR RESEARCH CORP., THE NEW 
BANKRUPTCY EPIDEMIC: FORECASTS, CAUSES, AND RISK CONTROL 94 (2001)). 
 45. See James E. Rankin & Brendan Leary, Personal Income and Outlays: May 2009, 
BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, June 26, 2009, available at http://www.bea.gov/ 
newsreleases/national/pi/2009/pdf/pi0509.pdf; Jack Healy, As Incomes Rebound, Saving 
Hits Highest Rate in 15 Years, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2009, at B7 (“Although saving money 
helps individuals repair their finances and pay debts, a sharp rise in overall personal saving can 
actually deepen a recession and hurt the people who are saving more. As people save money, 
fewer dollars circulate through shopping malls, Main Street businesses, and large employers 
and subsequently back to workers through their paychecks. This thrift pulls the economy 
lower.”). 
 46. See James E. Rankin & Brendan Leary, Personal Income and Outlays: August 2009, 
BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, Oct. 1, 2009, http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/ 
2009/pdf/pi0809.pdf [hereinafter Personal Income and Outlays 2009]. 
 47. See Am. Payroll Ass’n, Most Americans Living Paycheck to Paycheck, Still 
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Thus, most Americans simply are not able to maintain a personal 
rate of savings that would allow them to survive a loss of income 
caused by a medical crisis. With little or no savings, families simply 
do not have a “rainy day” fund to weather multiple setbacks. For 
example, a family that is pushed to the brink by an adjustable-rate 
mortgage often has no extra money to cover expenses when wages 
are lost due to an unexpected illness. Without adequate savings, 
most families faced with a medical crisis dangle on the precipice of 
bankruptcy. 
Further, having health insurance is not enough to insulate 
families from facing financial ruin. In many cases, high out-of-pocket 
maximum expenditures and high deductibles result in families having 
to shoulder a large portion of the costs of medical treatments.48 Even 
worse, in many cases individuals covered under such high deductible 
or catastrophic plans will delay going to the doctor for routine 
medical care and not seek care for seemingly minor ailments, which 
when left untreated all too often become harder and more costly to 
cure, ultimately requiring more missed days to remedy.49 For this 
reason, many families that have health insurance are still not prepared 
to shoulder the costs that their health insurance fails to cover.50 
Moreover, health insurance is designed simply to replace lost wages 
and income when workers suffer from an extended illness. 
 
Contributing to 401(k), MARKETWIRE (Sept. 30, 2009, 11:22 AM), 
http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/most-americans-living-paycheck-paycheck-still-
contributing-401k-according-survey-american-1202899.htm (“Seventy one percent of 
American employees are living paycheck to paycheck, according to results released today from 
the 2009 ‘Getting Paid in America’ survey.”); Joseph Pisani, More Upper-Income Workers 
Living Paycheck to Paycheck, CNBC NEWS ASS’N (Sept. 16, 2009, 11:48 AM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/32862851 (“Thirty percent of workers with salaries of $100,000 
or more said they are living paycheck to paycheck, up from 21 percent last year, according to 
the survey of 4400 workers nationwide. Overall, 61 percent said they always or usually live 
paycheck to paycheck, up from 49 percent in 2008 and 43 percent in 2007.”). 
 48. See Melissa Jacoby, The Debtor-Patient Revisited, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 307, 309–10 
(2007) (discussing an analysis from the 2003 MEPS survey that found that 2.8% of non-elderly 
individuals lived in families with out-of-pocket expenditures (including insurance premiums) 
exceeding $10,000 that year, 14% were in families spending more than $5000, and 43% lived 
in families with out-of-pocket expenditures exceeding $2000). 
 49. It is estimated that the economy loses $207 billion a year because of the poor health 
and shorter lifespan of the uninsured and underinsured. Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §1501, 124 Stat. 119, 908 (2010). 
 50. See Walecia Konrad, Health Insurance with High Deductibles Isn’t Always a Bargain, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2009, at B6 (noting that low caps on lifetime coverage and high out-of-
pocket costs for doctor visits are hidden costs that might make these plans undesirable for 
many workers). 
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In contrast, disability insurance is specifically designed to provide 
wage replacement when income is lost due to an accident or illness. 
Thus, individuals and families who are covered by disability insurance 
receive a certain level51 of wage replacement to compensate for the 
wages lost due to an unexpected illness. Having wage replacement 
will likely enable most families to avoid or at least significantly delay 
becoming a foreclosure and bankruptcy statistic. Unfortunately, 
most Americans do not purchase disability insurance. Americans buy 
life insurance to provide for their families after death, but they rarely 
buy insurance to protect their families in the event that they lose 
their ability to work.52 Given the likelihood of disability, it is essential 
that more families have access to disability insurance in order to 
ensure financial stability during a medical crisis. 
III. THE DISABILITY IMBROGLIO 
Mention the word “disability” and people will likely conjure up 
images of persons who have congenital or developmental disabilities 
such as cerebral palsy, mental retardation, or Down syndrome. 
Disability can mean different things in different contexts, but this 
Article focuses on a concept of disability that includes a physical or 
mental impairment caused by an illness or accident that impedes an 
individual from working in her normal capacity. As shall be 
discussed, such disabilities occur rather frequently and are often 
linked to consumer bankruptcy filings and foreclosures. 
In the United States, a disabling injury occurs every second. This 
amounts to sixty disabling injuries per minute and over 85,000 each 
day. Surprisingly, more than 90% of the disabilities in the U.S. are 
not work-related and hence not covered under worker’s 
compensation benefits.53 Almost forty-two million Americans are 
disabled.54 Sixteen percent of the female population is disabled and 
 
 51. See infra Part VI.A.2 for a detailed explanation of levels of income replacement. 
 52. See, e.g., David Futrelle, Fear Factor: We All Worry About Money. Problem Is, We’re 
Scared of the Wrong Things, MONEY, Oct. 2005, at 86, available at http://money.cnn.com/ 
magazines/moneymag/moneymag_archive/2005/10/01/8277950/index.htm (noting that 
50% of Americans buy life insurance while only 28% buy disability insurance even though there 
is a greater chance of becoming disabled before sixty-five than dying before sixty-five). See also 
AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 2009 63 (“Americans 
purchased $3.0 trillion of new life insurance coverage in 2008.”). 
 53. NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, INJURY FACTS 2008 EDITION 52 (2008). 
 54. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Census Bureau News, Facts for Features: 
Americans with Disabilities Act: July 26th (May 27, 2008), available at 
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14% of the male population is disabled.55 About one-fourth of 
Americans entering the work force today will become disabled before 
they retire.56 Most disabilities are attributed to pregnancy57 or illness. 
The leading causes of illness include cancer, heart disease, and 
diabetes.58 Back injuries and accidents also are common causes of 
disability.59 
Thus, a period of disability can be caused by a myriad of reasons. 
For instance, the woman next door, who is battling breast cancer,60 
will be disabled when she is unable to work while undergoing 
chemotherapy and radiation treatments. Mounting medical bills and 
missed wages from mounting absences from work for medical 
treatments could easily wipe out her savings (if she was lucky enough 
to even have savings), and she could be teetering on financial ruin 
regardless of whether or not she is covered by health insurance.61 
Similarly, the young associate at a law firm who is injured in a serious 
car accident will be disabled during her recovery period. Finally, the 
middle-aged man who decides to reduce the stress in his life by 
enrolling in a yoga class and strains his back will be disabled for the 
several weeks that he is out of the office recovering from his back 
injury. All three would easily face severe financial strain without 
disability insurance to replace the income lost while recuperating. 
In spite of the relatively high chances of becoming disabled 




 55. Id. 
 56. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., Social Security Basic Facts, SSA.GOV (May 17, 2011), 
http://www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/basicfact.htm [hereinafter Social Security Basic Facts]. 
 57. See The Basics of Short Term Disability Insurance, INSURE.COM, 
http://www.insure.com/articles/disabilityinsurance/short-term-disability.html (last updated 
Jan. 29, 2010). 
 58. See id. 
 59. See Personal Income and Outlays 2009, supra note 46. 
 60. The five-year relative survival rate for female breast cancer patients has increased 
from 63% in the early 1960s to 89% today. See Press Release, Am. Cancer Soc’y, Cancer Facts 
& Figures 2009, at 11, available at http://www.cancer.org/acs/groups/content/@nho/ 
documents/document/500809webpdf.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2011). 
 61. See Jacoby, supra note 5; see also Joanna Stavins, Credit Card Borrowing, 
Delinquency, and Personal Bankruptcy, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., July/Aug. 2000, at 21, 24 
(finding 70.73% insurance rate among bankruptcy filers in 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances 
and noting that those with health insurance were more likely to have filed for bankruptcy). 
 62. Although most Americans lack disability insurance, over two-thirds of all families in 
the U.S. own some kind of life insurance. In 2008, total life insurance coverage in the U.S. 
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private sector, lack disability insurance.63 Without disability insurance 
and without personal savings, Americans have few options for 
avoiding bankruptcy and foreclosure in the wake of income 
disruptions and medical illness. As mentioned previously, the 
majority of Americans are living from paycheck to paycheck64 with 
little or no savings.65 This means that even with health insurance 
many are unable to handle their share of the medical costs due to a 
lack of savings and the high out-of-pocket medical costs that are 
associated with many insurance plans.66 Consequently, very little 
stands between the average worker and financial ruin when a medical 
crisis happens. 
The data collected from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project, 
discussed previously in Part II, shows an alarming increase in the 
number of consumer bankruptcy petitions and home foreclosures. In 
2008, bankruptcies were up 31%67 and foreclosures were up 81% 
from the previous year. 68 Interviews with debtors, reviews of 
bankruptcy petitions, and interviews with individuals whose homes 
are in the foreclosure process all paint a similar picture. The studies 
taken as a whole illustrate that average working Americans quickly 
deplete what little savings they have when a medical crisis occurs. 
Soon the combination of medical bills and lost wages pushes families 
into bankruptcy court and out of their homes. 
Having disability insurance as a safety net would go a long way 
toward helping workers weather a medical crisis. For instance, the 
leading cause of long-term disability is cancer.69 Medical advances 
 
totaled 19.1 trillion dollars. See Ginger Applegarth, Disability Insurance Can Save Your Life, 
MSN MONEY, http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Insurance/InsureYourHealth/ 
DisabilityInsuranceCanSaveYourLife.aspx. 
 63. See Social Security Basic Facts, supra note 56. 
 64. See Pisani, supra note 47. 
 65. See Rankin & Leary, supra note 46. 
 66. See Jacoby, supra note 48, at 309–10. 
 67. Press Release, Am. Bankr. Inst., May Consumer Bankruptcy Filings Increase Nearly 
31 Percent over Previous Year (June 5, 2008), available at http://www.abiworld.org/ 
AM/PrinterTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONT
ENTID=53116; see also Christie, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
 68. Press Release, RealtyTrac, Foreclosure Activity Increases 81 Percent in 2008 (Jan. 
15, 2009), available at http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/foreclosure-
activity-increases-81-percent-in-2008-4551; see also Christie, supra note 17. 
 69. See Press Release, Unum, Survivors of Cancer More Likely to Return to Work Than 
in Past Years (April 28, 2011), available at http://unum.newshq.businesswire.com/press-
release/research-news/cancer-leads-causes-unum%E2%80%99s-disability-claims-10th-year. 
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and increased access to health care have led to a decline in the 
incidence and mortality rates associated with the lung, prostate, 
breast, and colorectal cancers, the four most common types of 
cancer.70 The National Cancer Institute estimates that approximately 
11.1 million Americans with a cancer diagnosis were alive in 2005, 
and the five-year survival rate for all cancers diagnosed between 1996 
and 2004 was 66%, up from 50% during the 1975 to 1977 period.71 
Despite the fact that survival rates are increasing, the numbers of 
people diagnosed with cancer each year still remains high. 
Roughly 1.5 million workers will be diagnosed with cancer this 
year.72 Many of these 1.5 million workers will undergo 
chemotherapy or radiation treatments. Some will face temporary 
disability and others will have a long-term disability. Most of these 
1.5 million workers will not meet the Social Security Disability 
Income definition of “disabled” because they will not meet the 
requirement that either the period of disability last 12 months or be 
likely to result in death.73 In addition, most of these 1.5 million 
workers will not qualify for worker’s compensation because their 
cancer will not be caused by workplace exposure to a cancer-causing 
agent, such as asbestos. Retirement benefits will also likely be 
unavailable to these 1.5 million workers diagnosed with cancer 
because they will not meet the definition of “totally disabled” as 
defined by many retirement plans.74 These 1.5 million workers 
diagnosed with cancer are representative of the many workers75 who 
 
 70.  U.S. Nat’l Inst. of Health, Cancer Trends Progress Report – 2009/2010 Update, 
NAT’L CANCER INST., http://progressreport.cancer.gov/highlights.asp (last visited Sep. 19, 
2011). 
 71. See Am. Cancer Soc’y, supra note 60, at 1–2. 
 72. An estimated 766,130 men and 713,220 women will be diagnosed with cancer in 
2009. Of the estimated number of men diagnosed with cancer, 25% will have prostate cancer, 
15% will have lung cancer, and 10% will have colon cancer. Of the estimated number of 
women diagnosed with cancer, 27% will have breast cancer, 14% will have lung cancer, and 
10% will have colon cancer. See id. at 4. 
 73. See GEORGE E. REJDA, SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ECONOMIC SECURITY 264–65 
(1999). 
 74. See infra Part IV.D (discussing retirement plans). 
 75. Similar to advances in cancer treatment, the advances in the treatment of human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) have 
resulted in much longer life expectancies and an increasing number of survivors returning to 
work. See Anne Cristiansen Bullers, Living with AIDS–20 Years Later, FDA CONSUMER, 
Nov.–Dec. 2001, at 33–34 (noting that the late 1990s has been called the “golden era” of 
HIV/AIDS treatment because of the discovery of the effectiveness of a variety of powerful and 
effective drug cocktails). The longer life expectancies created a surge in HIV/AIDS-positive 
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will take time off from work to recover from an illness without 
adequate disability coverage.76 
Whether faced with cancer, bed-rest during pregnancy, weeks of 
recovery from heart surgery, or one of the multitude of other 
disabilities, most workers will find that they have few resources 
available to replace the income lost during their recovery period 
when they are unable to work. Thus, disability insurance is needed to 
bridge the income gap created by lost wages during a medical crisis. 
Disability insurance pays a percentage of lost wages when a worker 
cannot work due to an illness or injury. Often the benefits provided 
by a disability plan can be the difference between making ends meet 
during a medical crisis and falling behind on mortgage notes and car 
payments. 
In general, there are two categories of disability insurance 
available to workers: short-term disability insurance and long-term 
disability insurance. Short-term disability insurance is designed to 
provide workers with income replacement if they become disabled 
for a short duration, usually a year or less.77 Typically, short-term 
disability policies provide a worker with a portion of her pre-
disability wages, most commonly one-half to two-thirds of her pre-
disability income for a period of thirteen, twenty-six, or fifty-two 
weeks.78 Short-term disability claims are most often filed due to 
pregnancy and non-back-related injuries.79 
In contrast, long-term disability insurance is designed to provide 
benefits to workers when the period of disability is expected to last 
for a long period of time—usually a year or more.80 Benefits under a 
long-term disability insurance plan typically begin at the expiration 
of short-term benefits. Like short-term disability policies, long-term 
 
individuals returning to work, and many of those trying to return to work face a myriad of 
difficulties. Because of the increased demand from clients seeking to return to the workforce, 
some advocates began publishing guides to help with the transition. See, e.g., AIDS LAW 
PROJECT OF PA., RETURNING TO WORK: A HELPFUL GUIDE (Dec. 2002), available at 
www.aidslawpa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/backtowork.pdf. 
 76. Like individuals with AIDS, cancer survivors who return to work often complain of 
difficulties with health and life insurance and “a lack of understanding from co-workers.” See 
Evelien R. Spelten et al., Factors Reported to Influence the Return to Work of Cancer Survivors: 
A Literature Review, Psycho-Oncology, 11 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 124, 124 (2002). 
 77. See The Basics of Short Term Disability Insurance, supra note 57. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 4:45 PM 
1327 State-Mandated Disability Insurance 
 1343 
policies typically replace anywhere from one-half to two-thirds of the 
worker’s lost wages.81 The most common long-term disability claims 
stem from cancer, pregnancy complications, back injuries, heart 
disease, and diabetes.82 
Thus, short-term and long-term disability insurance are designed 
to provide a portion of the income lost when workers are forced to 
miss work due to an injury or sickness. The disability benefits 
received under a short-term or long-term disability policy can be 
used to pay the mortgage, health insurance premiums, food costs, 
and other basic necessities. Without disability insurance, most 
Americans have few alternative means of covering the cost of basic 
needs when faced with an unexpected injury or illness. Missed work 
equals missed wages; missed wages equal missed payments on 
homes, cars, and medical bills, and soon, bankruptcy. Most workers 
are not insured against these categories of worries. 
Unfortunately, most Americans lack adequate disability 
insurance.83 This is in large part because they do not have access to 
moderately priced disability insurance. Individual disability policies 
are often hard to find and even harder to qualify for.84 In addition, 
individual policies are notoriously expensive.85 Group disability  
insurance,86 which is sometimes provided as a fringe benefit of 
 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See Social Security Basic Facts, supra note 56. 
 84. In order to qualify for an individual insurance policy, the worker must complete a 
full application, take a physical examination, and otherwise qualify for the insurance. See AM. 
COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, DISABILITY INCOME INSURANCE: FINANCIAL PROTECTION FOR 
YOU AND YOUR FAMILY, http://www.acli.com/Consumers/ 
Disability%20Income%20Insurance/Documents/e09ac83683ae42189dc919484b0de605DI_
Consumer_Broch1.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2011) (noting that individual carriers look more 
closely at the policy applicant and consider a variety of factors to determine whether they will 
cover her the premium amount, including age, benefit amount, benefit period, current health 
status, gender, tobacco use, and type of job). 
 85. See Kelly L. Knudson, California State Disability Insurance: Privatization Is the 
Answer to Employee Woes, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 539, 548 (2006) (lamenting the expense of 
individual long-term disability plans and noting that “[i]n 2003, the average annual premium 
for a non-cancelable policy was $1336”). 
 86. Group disability insurance is the term used for disability insurance purchased by a 
group as opposed to a single individual purchasing a policy from an insurer. Large employers 
contract with insurers to provide disability benefits for employees at a discounted group rate. 
See, e.g., Benefits and Other Programs, BANK OF AMERICA, http://careers.bankofamerica.com/ 
learnmore/benefits.asp (last visited Feb. 18, 2011); Benefits, HOME DEPOT, INC., 
https://careers.homedepot.com/cg/content.do?p=benefits (last visited Feb. 18, 2011); 
Benefits, KROGER CO., http://www.kroger.com/company_information/careers/ 
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employment, is easier to qualify for and is significantly cheaper.87 
A recent survey by the Department of Labor found that in 2009 
roughly 37% of workers had access to group short-term disability 
insurance through their employer.88 Of the workers with access, 97% 
of them enrolled in the short-term disability plan.89 Nationwide 
about 36% of workers have coverage under a group short-term 
disability insurance plan.90 Not surprisingly, white-collar workers are 
the most likely to have access to short-term disability insurance 
through their employer. Around 43% of white-collar workers have 
employer-provided access to short-term disability benefits.91 In 
contrast, service workers have the least access. Only about 23% of 
service workers have employers who offer a short-term disability 
insurance plan.92 
Similarly, about 33% of workers have access to a group long-term 
disability insurance plan through their employer, and about 32% of 
all private sector workers are covered by a group long-term disability 
insurance plan.93 About 96% of workers elected long-term disability 
insurance when a group rate was offered through their employer. 
Fifty percent of white-collar workers have long-term disability 
insurance coverage, while only 15% of service workers have 
coverage.94 Overall, the data clearly shows that employees participate 
in very high numbers when offered group disability insurance by 
their employer. As a result, increasing the percentage of employers 
who offer group disability insurance should greatly increase the 
 
Pages/benefits.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2011). Workers employed by companies that do not 
offer group disability insurance might still be able to participate in a group disability insurance 
plan sponsored by an industry, trade, or professional association such as the American Bar 
Association or the American Medical Association. See, e.g., Disability Insurance, AMERICAN 
BAR ENDOWMENT, http://www.abendowment.org/insurance/dis_lt.asp (last visited Mar. 1, 
2011) (offering group disability insurance to members of the American Bar Association). 
 87. See JHA, 2008 U.S. GROUP DISABILITY MARKET SURVEY SUMMARY REPORT 7 
(Apr. 2009), available at https://www.genre.com/sharedfile/pdf/GDMS200904-en.pdf 
(noting that in 2008, the average annual premium for a group long-term disability insurance 
was $225 a year). 
 88. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 
SURVEY tbl. 16 (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2009/ 
ownership/civilian/table12a.htm. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. 
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number of workers covered by group disability benefits. 
When group disability insurance is offered, the employee 
typically has the option of electing short-term disability insurance, 
long-term disability insurance, or both. As with most group 
programs, the cost of group disability insurance is usually less than 
that of similar individual disability insurance programs. The average 
premium for a group short-term disability policy was $202 per year 
in 2008.95 When a short-term disability policy is purchased through 
an employer, the policy is “guaranteed issue”—meaning a subscriber 
does not have to take a medical exam to prove insurability. If a 
worker’s employer does not offer short-term disability coverage, 
individual policies are only available on an extremely limited basis. 
Similarly, the average cost for long-term disability coverage 
under a group plan is roughly $225 a year. 96 Unlike the short-term 
disability market, an individual long-term disability policy is widely 
available, albeit at a significant cost. An individual long-term 
disability policy purchased directly from an insurer costs well over 
$1000 each year on average.97 This price difference is substantial to 
the average worker. For example, a forty-year-old male professional 
who makes $50,000 a year would pay about $1,700 a year for a 
policy that would pay him $2,900 a month for up to five years for a 
covered disability.98 In contrast, if the forty-year-old professional 
were covered under a group plan offered through his employer, then 
he could enjoy similar coverage for about $225 a year.99 Thus, the 
lack of access to moderately priced disability insurance means that 
most Americans do not purchase disability insurance and are left 
without a needed safety net when they are unable to work due to an 
illness or injury.100 
The failure of employers to readily offer disability insurance is in 
part based on the lack of aggressive marketing by insurers. Kenneth 
Abraham and Lance Liebman have articulated two theories for why 
insurers have allowed the private disability market to remain 
 
 95. See JHA, supra note 87, at 8. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See Stacey L. Bradford, Do You Need Disability Insurance?, SMART MONEY (Sept. 
10, 2008), http://www.smartmoney.com/plan/insurance/do-you-need-disability-insurance-
17318/. 
 98. See What is Income Disability Protection?, UNUM, http://www.unum.com/ 
disability101/WhatIsIt.aspx#howmuch (last visited Feb. 13, 2011). 
 99. See JHA, supra note 87, at 7. 
 100. See infra Part IV. 
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anemic.101 First, the threat of adverse selection limits interest from 
insurers in increasing their disability insurance offerings. Adverse 
selection generally refers to the disproportionate tendency of those 
who are more likely to suffer losses to seek insurance against those 
losses. Thus, most applicants seeking disability coverage seek out the 
coverage because of a belief that they have some risk factors that 
increases their need for coverage. This phenomenon raises costs for 
the insurers and policyholders alike. Thus, those who do not fully 
appreciate the probability of a disabling injury will likely be deterred 
from buying coverage because of the higher prices and lack of 
appreciation for the true scope of the risk.102 
Second, “moral hazard” ratchets up the cost of individual 
disability insurance policies and limits their supply. Moral hazard is 
the tendency of an insured party to exercise less care to minimize 
losses than she would exercise if she were uninsured.103 Moral hazard 
is present both ex ante and ex post in the disability context. One 
who has disability insurance is more likely to become disabled than 
an uninsured person and is more likely to have a slower recovery or 
to never recover.104 Insurers try to induce policyholders to recovery 
quickly by limiting coverage to typically no more than 60% of after-
tax income and by reducing benefits by the amounts recovered from 
Social Security and workers’ compensation programs.105 
In sum, employees often do not appreciate the risk of being 
disabled and those employees who do appreciate the risk do not 
 
 101. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and 
Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 
75, 101 (1993) (noting that historical reasons have limited the appeal of disability insurance to 
lower wage workers and arguing that “the extension of [Social Security Disability] to virtually 
all Social Security participants after 1956, the growth of some state disability protection 
programs, and the indexing of SSD benefits in 1972 essentially have made the lower-income 
market an unlikely source of private disability insurance policyholders”). 
 102. See id. at 102 n.82. Although all voluntary insurance is affected to some extent by 
adverse selection, the disability insurance market is especially vulnerable to adverse selection 
because the application screening process that is typically used to neutralize this problem in 
other insurance contexts tends to be least effective in the disability insurance context. There is 
a lack of reliable data to base predictions on. For instance, morbidity data is not as widely 
available as mortality data, nor is it as reliable. Additionally, whether an injury or sickness will 
disable an individual is dependent, in large part, on personality traits which are hard to reduce 
to objective indices. Id. 
 103. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 64–83 (1986). 
 104. See Abraham & Liebman, supra note 101, at 102. 
 105. See id. at 103. 
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readily have access to moderately priced disability insurance. As a 
result, the majority of American workers rely on inadequate 
substitutes for disability insurance. A minority of workers, however, 
are covered by state-mandated disability insurance. As will be 
discussed in Part V, states that have mandated short-term insurance 
generally have a lower per-capita consumer bankruptcy rate than the 
national average. 
IV. SUBSTITUTES FOR DISABILITY INSURANCE 
Because most workers are not covered by state-mandated 
disability insurance, most workers are not covered by any disability 
insurance policy and rely on ineffective substitutes for disability 
insurance. This Part discusses alternatives to disability insurance that 
are commonly thought to provide some protection against a 
disability. Although these substitutes can ameliorate the effects of a 
medical crisis, they are not adequate substitutes for disability 
insurance. 
A. Comprehensive Health Care: An Inadequate Solution 
From the bankruptcy courts to Congress and everywhere in 
between, there is no shortage of evidence showing that health care 
costs are crippling families in America. Thus, many interested parties 
and pundits alike have advocated for some level of health care reform 
as the cure to the medical bankruptcy imbroglio. 
Growth in national health expenditures (NHE) in the United 
States was projected to be 6.1% in 2008. The average annual NHE 
growth is expected to be 6.2% per year for 2008 through 2018. By 
2018, national health spending is expected to reach $4.4 trillion and  
comprise just over one-fifth (20.3%) of the gross domestic product 
(GDP).106 In 2009, national health spending was $2.5 trillion.107 
Health care costs also comprise a larger part of family budgets. 
As a result, workers are increasingly unable to afford comprehensive 
health insurance. The average cost of an employer-subsidized health 
insurance policy for a family of four increased by 131% between 
 
 106. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE 
PROJECTIONS 2008–2018, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/ 
NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/proj2008.pdf. 
 107. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(B) (West 2010). 
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1999 and 2009.108 In 2009, the average cost of an employer-
subsidized health insurance policy for a family of four was $13,375, 
which is almost equal to the yearly salary for someone making 
minimum wage.109 Nationally, private health insurance spending 
totaled $854 billion.110 
Health insurance costs are out of reach for too many families, 
leading many to call for substantial health care reform. While there is 
almost universal agreement that America’s health care system needs 
reform, there is scant agreement about how to fix it or even what ails 
the system. The road to health care reform has traditionally been a 
political quagmire; therefore, efforts to reform health care in America 
have gained momentum at various junctures over the past century 
with typically little success.111 
One of the earliest, most organized campaigns for compulsory 
health insurance in the United States was started by the American 
Association for Labor Legislation (AALL). The AALL was an 
organization of economists, lawyers, and other reformers who 
studied labor legislation and pushed reforms in the early part of the 
twentieth century.112 The organization was triumphant in passing 
workers’ compensation legislation. Germany had inaugurated the 
first national system of compulsory health insurance in 1883, 
followed closely by Norway in 1909 and Britain in 1911. In turn, 
momentum seemed to be swelling for compulsory health care in 
America.113 Buoyed by its workers’ compensation victory, the AALL 
decided to expand its agenda to include health care coverage for low-
income workers. It produced a model health insurance bill in 1915 
and initially garnered the support of the American Medical 
 
 108. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER 
HEALTH BENEFITS: 2009 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 1 (2009) available at 
http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2009/ 7937.pdf. 
 109. Id. 
 110. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(B) (West 2011). 
 111. For accounts of health care reform in the U.S., see, e.g., RONALD L. NUMBERS, 
ALMOST PERSUADED: AMERICAN PHYSICIANS AND COMPULSORY HEALTH INSURANCE, 
1912–1920 (1978); Theodore R. Marmor & Jonathan Oberlander, Paths to Universal Health 
Insurance: Progressive Lessons from the Past for the Future, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 205, 208 
(2004). 
 112. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE 
RISE OF A SOVEREIGN PROFESSION AND THE MAKING OF A VAST INDUSTRY 243 (1982). 
 113. See Samuel Levey & James Hill, Universal Health Insurance: Incrementalism or 
Comprehensive Reform?, 3 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 189, 191 (1991). 
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Association.114 
In a nutshell, the bill limited coverage to workers earning less 
than $1,200 a year. The services of physicians, nurses, and hospitals 
were included, as was sick pay, maternity benefits, and a death 
benefit of fifty dollars to pay for funeral expenses. Costs were to be 
shared between workers, employers, and the state. 
The AALL’s push ultimately ended in failure. In the end, special 
interest groups and a changing political climate led to the defeat of 
the bill. The American Medical Association, unions, and commercial 
insurance companies all lobbied against the bill because a 
disagreement had arisen over physician payments within the 
American Medical Association; the unions feared that if the 
government provided health insurance, the unions’ power might 
wane, and the commercial insurance industry feared lost profits.115 
Moreover, the political climate changed dramatically when 
America entered World War I in 1917. Nationalism and anti-
communist rhetoric, along with the typical priority shifts during 
wartime, led to the first defeat of compulsory health care. If the 
AALL’s vision of comprehensive health care had passed, consumer 
bankruptcies arising from medical illness or injury would likely not 
be a problem today. 
With the defeat of the AALL’s bill, later attempts at health care 
focused more narrowly on benefits for the cost of receiving health 
care services. Thus, no health reform proposals since the AALL’s 
proposal have included a wage replacement component for disabled 
workers. The election of President Clinton in 1992 marked the first 
time since Truman116 that a president had made national health care 
 
 114. See Jill Quadagno, Physician Sovereignty and the Purchaser’s Revolt, 29 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 815, 816–17 (2004). 
 115. Karen S. Palmer, A Brief History: Universal Health Care Efforts in the U.S., 
PHYSICIANS FOR A NATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAM, http://www.pnhp.org/facts/ 
a_brief_history_universal_health_care_efforts_in_the_us.php?page=all (last visited Sept. 19, 
2011). 
 116. Truman was unexpectedly reelected President in 1948 after making universal health 
care the centerpiece of his campaign. See Sven Steinmo & Jon Watts, It’s the Institutions, 
Stupid! Why Comprehensive National Health Insurance Always Fails in America, 20 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 329, 342 (1995). In spite of polls taken in 1947 and 1948 showing strong 
public support for national health care, Truman failed to get the legislation passed. Id. at 343. 
The American Medical Association vigorously opposed the legislation and preyed on fears of 
“socialized medicine” to erode public support. Id. at 345. Although Democrats had a majority 
in Congress, southern Democrats voted with Republicans to block passage of the health bill, in 
part based on fears of having to end segregation in hospitals. See id. at 344–45. 
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a central part of his election platform.117 First Lady Hillary Clinton 
led the taskforce charged with drafting the bill. The fruit of her 
efforts was a very complex, nearly 1400-page bill known as the 
Health Security Act.118 Clinton’s attempt, like others in the past, 
failed. The complexity of the bill coupled with the secrecy 
surrounding its drafting played a role in its defeat. Although quite 
lengthy, the bill did not provide benefits comprehensively. It did not 
mandate paid sick, maternity, or paternity leave for workers, nor did 
it provide an additional death benefit. 
Special Interest Groups again played a large role in swaying 
public opinion against the bill.119 The Health Insurance Association 
of America sponsored the infamous “Harry and Louise” ad 
campaign, which portrayed an ordinary couple complaining about 
the government limiting their individual choices.120 Though many 
believe the ad did not affect public opinion, the ad is often credited 
with helping to deflate public support for the Clinton plan by 
portraying the plan as a threat to the public.121 An additional 
impediment to passage of the Clinton bill was that the Democrats 
were not able to agree on its contents, and Republicans were able to 
successfully mount opposition and galvanize the public.122 
In spite of past failures, in 2009, newly elected President Obama 
decided to press forward with making health care reform a top 
legislative priority. Having large Democratic majorities in the both 
the House and Senate seemed to present reformers with the perfect 
opportunity to actually pass sweeping legislation. Finally, after a 
century of false starts, it seemed all but certain that a health care 
reform bill, which would provide health insurance for most 
 
 117. See Theodore Marmor & Jonathan Oberlander, A Citizen’s Guide to Healthcare 
Reform, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 495, 495–96, 500 (1994). 
 118. Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1993). 
 119. See Raymond L. Goldsteen et al., Harry and Louise and Health Care Reform: 
Romancing Public Opinion, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1325, 1345–47 (2001) 
(suggesting that advertising of this sort can demobilize public support for health policy 
initiatives that are unfavorable to special interests). 
 120. Id. at 1326. 
 121. See id. at 1346. 
 122. Nonetheless, after Clinton’s attempt at comprehensive health reform failed, he was 
able to pass the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) as part of the Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997. Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997). SCHIP expanded Medicaid 
to provide federal matching funds to states that provide insurance to families with children. See 
id. 
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Americans, would finally become law.123 
Ultimately, on March 23, 2010, President Barrack Obama 
signed health care reform legislation into law.124 The Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (the “PPACA”) requires that all 
U.S. citizens and legal residents have qualifying health coverage. 
Those without coverage pay a tax penalty not to exceed 2.5% of 
household income.125 In the legislative history of the PPACA, 
Congress specifically noted how the cost of health care impacts 
commerce and the national economy. In particular, Congress noted 
the fact that “62% of all personal bankruptcies are caused in part by 
medical expenses” and argued that “[b]y significantly increasing 
health insurance coverage, the requirement, together with the other 
provisions of th[e] Act, will improve financial security for 
families.”126 
Thus, one of the thrusts of the PPACA is to make health 
insurance more affordable for families so that the costs of medical 
care will not cause families undue hardship and financial ruin. To 
that end, various subsidies make health insurance affordable for low- 
to moderate-income families.127 In addition, the PPACA reduces the 
out-of-pocket limits for those with incomes up to 400% of the 
federal poverty line.128 Finally, insurers are required to provide 
 
 123. Nonetheless, fortunes changed swiftly, and health care reform stalled again. The 
Democrats lost their filibuster-proof majority in the Senate, and again public support has 
waned. See generally Robert Pear & David M. Herzenshorn, Democrats Ask, Can This Health 
Care Bill Be Saved?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2010, at A9. 
 124. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010), as amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). 
 125. The penalty will be phased in according to the following schedule: $95 in 2014, 
$325 in 2015, and $695 in 2016 for the flat fee or 1.0% of taxable income in 2014, 2.0% of 
taxable income in 2015, and 2.5% of taxable income in 2016. 26. U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West 
2010). 
 126. Id. § 18091(a)(2)(G). 
 127. The PPACA provides premium credits such that the premium contributions are 
limited to the following percentages of income for specified income levels: For families earning 
up to 133% of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL), contributions are limited to no more than 2% 
of income; for families earning between 133% and 150% of the FPL, contributions are limited 
to no more than 4% of income; for families earning between 150% and 200% of the FPL, 
contributions are limited to no more than 6.3% of income; for families earning between 200% 
and 250% of the FPL, contributions are limited to no more than 8.05% of income; and for 
families earning between 250 and 400% of the FPL, contributions are limited to no more than 
9.5% of income. 
 128. Individuals and families between 100% and 200% of the FPL ($1983 per individual 
and $3967 per family); 200% and 300% of the FPL ($2975 per individual and $5950 per 
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dependent coverage for children up to the age of 26.129 
In spite of its noble efforts, the PPACA is unlikely to stem the 
tide of medical bankruptcies for three main reasons. First, the out-of-
pocket maximums are still too high for working Americans. The 
current recession is, in part, a product of high debt loads and the 
dismal rate of savings among American families.130 Therefore, with 
little to no money left after paying regular monthly household bills, 
many families are sure to encounter hardship even with an out-of-
pocket maximum as low as $2500. To assume that the average family 
earning roughly $40,000 can afford up to $6000 in out-of-pocket 
costs, as contemplated by the PPACA, is totally unrealistic. 
Second, the loss of income that accompanies a health crisis leaves 
families with medical bills and no income to pay those bills. The 
study by the Consumer Bankruptcy Project illustrated that most of 
the medically bankrupt had health insurance but still faced crippling 
out-of-pocket costs. Many of those families were ruined by out-of-
pocket costs below the caps in the PPACA.131 Five to ten thousand 
dollars in medical costs coupled with lost wages in a given year is still 
more than enough to drive many families into bankruptcy. The data 
shows that it is the combination of additional medical bills and the 
loss of wages that pushes families into bankruptcy. Seven out of ten 
debtors interviewed by the Consumer Bankruptcy Project reported 
that income loss due to health problems contributed “very much” to 
their bankruptcies. 132 Therefore, attempts to reduce the costs of 
medical care are an incomplete solution to reducing consumer 
bankruptcies. 
Finally, the fate of PPACA is still uncertain. A litany of states 
have pursued filings challenging the constitutionality of the PPACA. 
Currently, five judges have weighed in on the constitutionality of the 
PPACA, with two judges finding the legislation to be 
unconstitutional.133 Just as troubling, the Obama administration has 
 
family); and 300% and 400% of the FPL ($3987 per individual and $7973 per family). 
 129. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-14(a) (West 2011). 
 130. See POSNER, supra note 3. 
 131. For the findings of Consumer Bankruptcy Project, see supra note 5 and 
accompanying text. 
 132. See Jacoby & Warren, supra note 23, at 561. 
 133. See, e.g., Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that the 
PPACA did not violate the Commerce Clause, Necessary and Proper Clause, General Welfare 
Clause, or the Religious Freedom Restoration Act); Florida ex. rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (holding that health 
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granted broad waivers to four states that allow health insurance 
companies operating in those states to continue offering benefits that 
are below the minimum threshold provided for in the PPACA.134 
For the reasons discussed in this Part, it is unlikely that the 
PPACA or any remedy based entirely on expanding access to 
affordable health insurance will stem the tide of medical 
bankruptcies. The data illustrates that families file for bankruptcy 
because of missed wages and medical costs.135 Therefore, any 
solution must provide wage replacement during a health crisis when 
the worker is unable to work. Thus, the expansion of disability 
insurance is a necessary element of any effective solution. When 
trying to recover from an injury or sickness without disability 
insurance, families simply cannot pay medical bills, mortgage 
payments, and car notes when they lack savings and can no longer 
rely on their weekly paycheck. 
In addition, presenting the case to the American public regarding 
the necessity of disability insurance should be much easier than 
creating the buy-in that is necessary for a sweeping overhaul of 
health care financing. Many ardent supporters of the PPACA 
emphasized that roughly forty-seven million Americans, equaling 
18% of the population under the age of sixty-five, lack health 
insurance.136 Thus, supporters assumed that it would be axiomatic 
that, with 18% of Americans lacking health insurance, there would be 
a large groundswell of popular support. However, supporters 
overlooked the fact that over 200 million Americans had health 
insurance, and that many Americans were relatively content with 
 
insurance mandate exceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and that because 
the mandate was so inextricable linked to the entire act that the whole act was 
unconstitutional); Liberty Univ. v. Geithner,  753 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2010) (holding 
that the PPACA was a valid exercise of congressional Commerce Clause power); Thomas More 
Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (holding that the PPACA is a 
constitutional exercise of power under the Commerce Clause and that the penalty was not a 
tax-triggering Anti-Injunction Act); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598 
(E.D. Va. 2010) (holding that the PPACA exceeded the scope of Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause). 
 134. The four states are Florida, New Jersey, Ohio, and Tennessee. “To qualify for a 
waiver [the] state . . . must show that compliance with the federal requirement would cause ‘a 
significant increase in premiums or decrease in access to benefits.’” Robert Pear, Four States 
Get Waivers to Carry Out Health Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2011, at A22 (citation omitted). 
 135. See Jacoby & Warren, supra note 233, at 536. 
 136. See Diane Rowland & Adele Shartzer, America’s Uninsured: The Statistics and Back 
Story, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 618, 619 (2008). 
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their private plans and fearful of any changes to their plans and 
increased governmental regulation. Most Americans lack disability 
insurance,137 in contrast to health insurance. Therefore, any effort to 
increase access to disability insurance would be giving most 
Americans something they lack rather than taking away or altering 
something they have and are comfortable with. 
B. Social Security Benefits: An Inadequate Solution 
Social Security was expanded in 1956 to provide disability 
insurance for American workers with long-term disabilities. Today, 
most American workers who have long-term disability coverage have 
it through the federal Social Security Disability program.138 In July 
2011, 8,435,000 disabled workers received disability under the 
Social Security program. Those receiving benefits had an average 
monthly benefit of $1,069.90 (average spousal and children’s 
benefits amounts were $288.10 and $317.50, respectively).139 After 
twenty-four months, individuals who receive disability benefits under 
Social Security are also eligible for Medicare Part A, which covers 
hospital costs and a few other medical expenses, and Medicare Part 
B, which covers doctor bills and other medically necessary and  
preventive subjects.140 They are also eligible to participate in the 
prescription drug benefit under Medicare Part D.141 
Unfortunately, for a number of reasons, Social Security’s 
disability income does not provide an adequate safety net for many 
workers. As Warren has noted, “the holes in the SSDI safety net are 
large enough to drive a truck through—or for millions of families to 
fall through.”142 This is because the definition of disability is 
 
 137.  The Hartford Sees Drop in Number of U.S. Workers with Disability Insurance, THE 
HARTFORD (Sept. 20, 2011, 8:52:00 p.m.), http://www.thehartford.com/cs/ 
Satellite?pagename=GBD_Internet/HLI03Article/NewsArticle&cid=1287776844394&c=HL
I03Article&p=1248974913168. 
 138. See U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., DISABILITY PROGRAMS, http://www.ssa.gov/disability 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2010). 
 139. See U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., Monthly Statistical Snapshot, SOCIALSECURITY.GOV, 
(Oct. 2011), http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/stat_snapshot. 
 140. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE & YOU 18, 33–35, 36 
(2011), available at http://www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/10050.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2011). See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395(c) (West 2011). 
 141. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Supra note 140, at 56. 
 142. See Elizabeth Warren, The Growing Threat to Middle Class Families, 69 BROOK. L. 
REV. 401, 418 (2004). 
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extremely stringent. Although any individual who is covered under 
Social Security and suffers a disabling sickness or injury can apply for 
a monthly benefit, the covered individual must not be able to work 
in any occupation (not just her own occupation) because of a 
medically determined physical or mental impairment that is expected 
to last at least twelve months or result in death.143 Under this 
standard, for instance, the neighbor undergoing chemotherapy and 
radiation therapy in her quest to beat breast cancer, the young 
associate at the large law firm who was injured in a car accident, and 
the middle-aged man who injures his back while attempting a yoga 
pose would all fail to meet the requisite definition of disability. 
Because the standard of disability is so exacting, it is not surprising 
that about one-eighth of participants die before completing the two-
year waiting period.144 Therefore, the disability program under Social 
Security fails to provide easy access to income replacement for 
middle class families and individuals who are confronted with 
financial hardships as a result of a sudden illness or disability. 145 
C. Workers’ Compensation: An Inadequate Solution 
Every state has a workers’ compensation program that covers 
most workers.146 To be eligible for benefits under a workers’ 
compensation program, the disability must arise from accidents in 
the workplace or in performance of normal services. Workers’ 
compensation programs are funded by an employer’s purchase of 
qualified insurance or by specifically and tightly defined self-
insurance programs.147 
In addition to disability income, workers receiving workers’ 
compensation benefits usually receive medical care and rehabilitation 
benefits.148 Benefits are usually determined as a percentage—typically 
about 70% of the worker’s wage. However, like disability income 
provided under the Social Security program, there is usually a 
 
 143. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (2006); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505 (2009). 
 144. GINA LIVERMORE ET AL., COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ELIMINATING THE MEDICARE 
WAITING PERIOD FOR SSDI BENEFICIARIES 2 (2009). 
 145. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING 
AMERICAN SOCIAL INSURANCE 84 (1999). 
 146. See Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of Workers’ 
Compensation in the United States, 1900–1930, 41 J.L. & ECON. 305, 320 (1998). 
 147. See REJDA, supra note 73, at 264–65. 
 148. See id. at 265–67. 
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maximum weekly benefit amount that caps the benefits at a relatively 
low rate. In addition, benefits are sometimes determined by the 
degree of the worker’s disability, meaning that a worker might only 
qualify for payment for a partial disability.149 
Although workers’ compensation programs provide needed wage 
replacement for workers who are injured on the job, it is important 
to note that workers suffering from a non-work related injury or 
sickness are not eligible to receive benefits under workers’ 
compensation programs. As the economy has shifted from a 
manufacturing-based economy to one driven by the provision of 
information, innovation, finance, and services, the working 
environments for many workers have shifted from factories fraught 
with danger to relatively safe air-conditioned office buildings.150 
Currently, workplace injuries and illnesses represent a small fraction 
of the new cases of disability each year in the United States. In fact, 
almost 90% of the disabilities occurring each year in the U.S. are not 
work-related.151 Since most of the families and individuals teetering 
on the brink of financial disaster are grappling with medical crises 
that are not job-related, workers’ compensation benefits are not 
available as an additional source of income. Therefore, workers’ 
compensation programs are not a viable source of wage replacement 
for most American workers. 
D. Retirement Plans: An Inadequate Solution 
Another potential source of disability benefits is an employer-
sponsored retirement plan, such as a pension, or a profit-sharing or 
stock bonus plan qualified under section 401 of the Internal 
Revenue Code. The primary purpose of a qualified retirement plan is 
to provide retirement benefits when a participant leaves the 
workforce, which may occur earlier than the normal retirement date 
 
 149. See id. 
 150. The passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 also helped reduce 
the number workplace injuries. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 
91-596, § 2, 84 Stat. 1590–91 (1970). The Occupational Safety and Health Act was a federal 
effort to reduce the number of workplace hazards. The stated purpose of the Act was to 
“assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful 
working conditions.” See 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2006). In order to achieve that goal, the Act 
authorized the Secretary of Labor to establish mandatory national standards to assure worker 
health and safety. 29 U.S.C. § 655. This job is carried out by the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration, an agency within the Department of Labor. See id. 
 151. See NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, supra note 53, at 2. 
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if the participant is determined to be disabled. 
Disability benefits are provided as a secondary benefit of some 
retirement plans. The standard for disability under retirement plans 
varies widely. While most plans require a standard of an absolute and 
permanent disability, others may permit disability payments for a 
temporary disability. Disability payments received from a retirement 
plan by the disabled participant are generally fully taxable.152 
However, there may be some tax-free benefits paid if the payments 
are deemed to be funded by the employee’s own nondeductible 
contributions to the retirement plan.153 
From an employer’s perspective, retirement plans are attractive 
vehicles for meeting disability needs because the employer can take a 
current business expense deduction for its contributions to the plan 
and the employees are not currently taxed on these contributions. 
Instead, just like in the typical retirement context, employees are 
taxed only as benefits are disbursed from the plan.154 In all cases, the 
amount of any disability payment is dictated by the size of the 
retirement account or fund accrued for the benefit of the participant. 
Thus, the amount of the disability benefit usually correlates with the 
length of time that the disabled worker has participated in the plan. 
The amount of benefit increases with the length of participation.155 
Relying on a retirement plan to replace income lost in the wake 
of a disability can have severe consequences later in life. When faced 
with mounting medical bills, missed mortgage payments, and other 
crucial bills, withdrawing money from a retirement plan to replace 
lost income due to a disability might seem like a good idea; however, 
using retirement savings early comes at a tremendous cost. Namely, 
the individual has depleted some or all of her retirement nest egg. 
Depending on her age and length of the disability, she might not 
have enough healthy working years left to replenish her retirement 
 
 152. See IRS, PUBLICATION 525: TAXABLE AND NONTAXABLE INCOME, at 17 (2010), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/ irs-pdf/p525.pdf (“If you retired on disability, you 
must include in income any disability pension you receive under a plan that is paid for by your 
employer. You must report your taxable disability payments as wages on line 7 of Form 1040 
or Form 1040A until you reach minimum retirement age.”). 
 153. See 26 U.S.C. § 402 (2006). 
 154. See id. Typically, there is a 10% early withdrawal penalty on distributions taken from 
a retirement plan (i.e., 401(k), 403(b), or IRA). William Perez, Tax Penalty for Early 
Distribution of Retirement Funds, ABOUT.COM (Nov. 3, 2008), 
http://taxes.about.com/od/retirementtaxes/a/early_penalty.htm. 
 155. See 26 U.S.C. § 402. 
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account. Thus, siphoning off retirement income to pay her bills 
during a period of disability leaves her without a necessary retirement 
nest egg. 
In sum, retirement plans were designed to provide income for 
workers during retirement and not during a period of disability. At 
every phase of a worker’s career, withdrawing money from her 
retirement account to cope with a disability is fraught with peril, and 
in most cases will only delay a bankruptcy filing until the retirement 
years. 
V. A SOLUTION TO THE MEDICAL BANKRUPTCY AND DISABILITY 
IMBROGLIOS 
As discussed previously in Part IV, health insurance, Social 
Security, workers’ compensation, and retirement plans are 
inadequate substitutes for disability insurance. Providing workers 
with disability insurance is a necessary component of curing the 
medical bankruptcy imbroglio. In accounting for the wide variety in 
the number of bankruptcy filings across the states, researchers and 
scholars have overlooked the impact of mandated disability 
insurance. 
Recently, Lefgren and McIntrye attempted to account for the 
puzzling disparity in the rate of bankruptcy filings across the states.156 
The findings from their study suggest that the differing number of 
bankruptcy filings across states reflects, in large part, the relative 
costs of formal and informal default and legal institutions that exist 
in the states.157 The study also finds that the size of the public safety 
net and legality of payday lending were statistically and economically 
insignificant.158 The presence of mandated short-term disability 
coverage was not included in the public safety nets analyzed by 
Lefgren and McIntyre. 
As discussed previously, the purpose of disability insurance is to 
provide a basic level of wage replacement when a worker is unable to 
work due to illness or injury. Thus, it is understandable why having 
disability insurance would lessen the impact of an injury or illness 
and make it less likely that the individual would file for bankruptcy as 
 
 156. Lars Lefgren & Frank McIntyre, Explaining the Puzzle of Cross-State Differences in 
Bankruptcy Rates, 52 J.L. & ECON. 367 (2009). 
 157. See id. 
 158. See id. at 380. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 4:45 PM 
1327 State-Mandated Disability Insurance 
 1359 
a result of a medical crisis. The data on bankruptcy filings from the 
Administrative Office of U.S. Courts seems to support this 
hypothesis. California,159 Hawaii,160 New Jersey,161 New York,162 and 
Rhode Island163 are the only states that require employers to provide 
short-term disability benefits for their employees. These states 
require private employers to provide a minimum amount of short-
term disability benefits to all employees while disabled. States that 
have compulsory short-term disability plans for private sector 
employees are generally below the national average for bankruptcy 
filings. When comparing the average number of per capita 
bankruptcy filings in states with compulsory short-term disability 
insurance to the national per capita average, the average rate for the 
group of five states with compulsory short-term disability insurance 













 159. In 1946, the California State Legislature enacted a disability insurance program 
during its 56th session. At the time of the enactment, California had a surplus from employee 
unemployment insurance contributions and decided to establish the SDI program. See Pat 
Merrick, California’s Disability Insurance System, 304 INS. L.J. 371, 372 (1948). The program 
is called the State Disability Insurance (“SDI”) program and is administered by the 
Employment Development Department. See About the Program, ECON. DEV. DIVISION, ST. 
OF CAL., http://www.edd.ca.gov/Disability/About_the_Program.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 
2011). 
 160. The Hawaii Temporary Disability Insurance (“TDI”) law was enacted in 1969. 
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 392-1 to -101 (2009). 
 161. New Jersey’s program is also called Temporary Disability Insurance. N.J. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 43:21-25 to -65 (West 2009). 
 162. New York’s program is called New York Statutory Disability Insurance. N.Y. 
WORKERS’ COMP. LAW §§ 200–242 (McKinney 2006). 
 163. In 1942, Rhode Island was the first state to enact a temporary disability program for 
its workers. The program is called Temporary Disability Insurance (“RITDI”). R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§§ 28-39-1 to -41-33 (2010). 
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Figure 1: Comparison of Average U.S. Per Capita Bankruptcy 
Filings to Average of States with Compulsory STD Benefits164 
 










Figure 2: Comparison of Per Capita Bankruptcy Filings between 
States with Compulsory STD Benefits and the U.S. Average of 
Chapter 13 Petitions Filed During Year Ending June 30, 2009.165 
 
Although more advanced statistical analysis comparing 
bankruptcy filings in states with compulsory short-term disability 
insurance to those without compulsory disability insurance is 
warranted, these findings provide support for the idea that providing 
workers with compulsory short-term disability insurance coverage 
helps reduce the likelihood that a wage interruption due to a non-
work-related illness or accident will lead to bankruptcy. 
Thus, increasing worker access through state-mandated disability 
insurance seems to be an effective solution to combating the medical 
bankruptcy imbroglio. As a first step toward implementation of this 
solution, state legislators must be educated about the basics of how 
these insurance programs are administered and their positive impact 
on workers. 
 
 164. These figures represent bankruptcy filings per thousand individuals for year ending 
June 30, 2009. Population as of December 31, 2008, as estimated by the Administrative Office 
of the United States Courts. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR 
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: JUNE 30, 2009 (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2009/0609_f.pdf. 
 165. Bankruptcy filings per thousand individuals for year ending June 30, 2009. 
Population as of December 31, 2008, as estimated by the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts. Id. 
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VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO REDUCE THE MEDICAL 
BANKRUPTCY IMBROGLIO 
This Part describes the state-mandated insurance programs in 
detail and proposes increasing the number of states mandating short-
term disability coverage for all workers. As noted in the previous 
Part, only five states mandate short-term disability insurance in 
addition to workers’ compensation insurance for their workers.166 
The average per capita bankruptcy rate for states that have 
compulsory short-term disability coverage is below the national 
average. Although further statistical analysis is necessary, this 
suggests that expanding mandatory short-term disability insurance 
coverage to more states would help decrease the number of 
bankruptcies. 
A. Existing State-Mandated Disability Insurance Programs: A Better 
Solution 
1. Funding 
There are two funding models for state-mandated disability 
insurance programs. States have elected to fund their insurance 
programs by (1) requiring employees to fund the plan through a 
payroll deduction; or (2) giving employers the option of paying a 
certain percentage of wages into the program or cost sharing with 
employees. California and Rhode Island fund their programs 
exclusively through employee payroll deductions. Workers in 
California were taxed on income up to $90,669.00 in 2009 and up 
to $93,316.00 in 2010.167 The maximum employee contribution 
rate for California workers in 2010 was $1,026.48 (which is 1.1% of 
$93,316.00). Similarly, in Rhode Island, employees pay 1.3% of the 
first $58,400 of income to cover the cost of disability insurance in 
Rhode Island.168 
 
 166. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico also requires that employers provide short-term 
disability insurance for employees. See DEP’T OF LABOR, TEMPORARY DISABILITY INSURANCE 
(2009), available at http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/uilawcompar/2009/ 
disability.pdf. 
 167. See Disability Benefits 101, WORLD INST. ON DISABILITY, 
http://www.disabilitybenefits101.org/ca/programs/income_support/sdi/program2.htm#Pa
ying_into_SDI (last visited Feb. 17, 2010). 
 168. See R.I. DEPT. OF LABOR AND TRAINING, 2011 UI AND TDI QUICK REFERENCE, 
available at http://www.dlt.ri.gov/lmi/news/quickref.htm. 
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In contrast, in Hawaii, the employer has the option of paying the 
entire cost of the disability insurance or sharing the cost with its 
employees.169 If the employer opts to share the costs with employees, 
then the employer may deduct one-half of the premium cost but not 
more than 0.5% of the employees’ weekly wages up to the maximum 
of $4.39 per week for 2009.170 Similarly, in New York, employers 
may pay for coverage for their employees or share the cost with their 
employees.171 New York provides that an employer is allowed, but 
not required, to collect contributions from its employees to offset 
the cost of providing benefits. An employee’s contribution is 
computed at the rate of one-half of one percent of her wages, but 
may not be more than sixty cents per week.172 
Finally, in New Jersey both employers and employees are 
required to contribute to the disability insurance fund. In 2011, the 
employee contribution rate is one-half of one percent on the first 
$29,600 of wages paid by an employer in a calendar year. Although  
the rates vary, employers must also pay contributions on the first 
$29,600 in wages paid to each worker.173 
2. Benefits 
Although disability is defined slightly differently by each state, 
generally, benefits are payable for any disability which results from 
any non-job related mental or physical illness or injury that prevents 
the employee from performing her regular or customary work.174 
Illness or injury also includes pregnancy complications, childbirth, or 
 
 169. In addition, an employer may provide TDI benefits by adopting one of the 
following methods: (a) by purchasing insurance from an authorized insurance carrier, (b) by 
adopting a sick leave policy, which is in essence a self-insured plan, that must be approved by 
the state, or (c) by a collective bargaining agreement that contains sick leave benefits at least as 
favorable as required by the TDI. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 392-1 to -101 (2009). 
 170.  Id. § 392–43. 
 171. In New York, employers with more than one employee must provide coverage. In 
addition, larger companies have the option of becoming authorized by the Workers’ 
Compensation Board to self-insure. N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 211 (McKinney 2006). 
 172. Id. § 209. 
 173. See SEDGWICK CMS, 2011 STATE DISABILITY INSURANCE (SDI) SCHEDULES, 
available at http://www.vpainc.com/about/pdf/SDI.pdf. 
 174. The standard of disability under the state plans is much more generous than the 
Social Security definition. Under state plans, a worker is disabled when she can no longer 
perform her job. Under Social Security, a worker is disabled when a worker can no longer 
perform any job. See supra Part IV.B for a discussion of disability benefits under the Social 
Security program. 
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related medical conditions. In addition, California175 and New 
Jersey176 provide benefits for paid family leave. California’s disability 
insurance pays 55% of wages for up to fifty-two weeks of disability.177 
In 2010, the maximum weekly benefit amount was $987.178 To 
 
 175. California amended its disability program in 2002 to provide for paid family leave. 
Paid family leave is available when an employee takes time off from work to care for a seriously 
ill child, spouse, parent, or domestic partner, or to bond with a minor child within one year of 
the birth or placement of the child in connection with a foster care or adoption. Workers are 
limited to six weeks of paid family leave per year. See California Work and Family Coalition, 
Paid Family Leave California, PAIDFAMILYLEAVE.ORG, http://www.paidfamilyleave.org/ 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2010). California defines disability as an “illness or injury, whether 
physical or mental, including any illness or injury resulting from pregnancy, childbirth, or 
related medical condition.” CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2626(b)(1) (West 2009). 
 176. New Jersey provides for paid family leave but requires certification.  
b. Any period of family temporary disability leave for the serious health condition of 
a family member of the covered individual shall be supported by certification 
provided by a health care provider. The certification shall be sufficient if it states: 
  
(1) The date, if known, on which the serious health condition commenced; 
  
(2) The probable duration of the condition;  
 
(3) The medical facts within the knowledge of the provider of the certification 
regarding the condition;  
 
(4) A statement that the serious health condition warrants the participation of the 
covered individual in providing health care, as provided in the “Family Leave Act,” 
P.L.1989, C. 261 (C.34:11B-1 et seq.), and regulations adopted pursuant to that 
act;  
 
(5) An estimate of the amount of time that the covered individual is needed for 
participation in the care of the family member;  
 
(6) If the leave is intermittent, a statement of the medical necessity for the 
intermittent leave and the expected duration of the intermittent leave; and  
 
(7) If the leave is intermittent and for planned medical treatment, the dates of the 
treatment. 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21–39.2 (West 2011). 
 177. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 2653, 2655 (West 2009). 
 178. Benefits Amounts for Disability Insurance, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
DEPARTMENT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, http://www.edd.ca.gov/Disability/Benefits.htm (last 
visited Feb. 18 2011). The benefit amount under this program is calculated by looking at a 
worker’s wages during a specific twelve-month period of time. The twelve-month base period 
begins roughly seventeen months before the worker becomes disabled and ends about five 
months before the disability begins. The twelve-month base period is divided into four 
quarters, and the quarter when the worker had the highest earnings is the quarter used to 
determine the benefit amount. 
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receive the maximum benefit amount an individual must have earned 
at least $23,305.46 in a calendar quarter during the base period.179 
There is also a waiting period of seven days before benefits are 
payable.180 
Hawaii’s disability insurance provides cash benefits of 58% of the 
disabled employee’s average weekly wages.181 The maximum weekly 
benefit for 2009 is $510.182 Workers are eligible for benefits from the 
eighth day of disability, and there is a seven-consecutive-day waiting 
period.183 Benefits are limited to a maximum of twenty-six weeks of 
benefit payments during a benefit year.184 Similarly, under New 
York’s insurance program,185 the benefit rate is 50% of the 
employee’s last eight weeks of average gross wages with a maximum 
benefit of $170 per week.186 A worker must be off work eight 
consecutive days to be eligible for benefits. The first week (seven 
days) is a waiting week that is not paid.187 The maximum benefit 
period is twenty-six weeks in a fifty-two-week period.188 Thus, the 
benefits available under New York’s system are by far the least 
generous. 
In New Jersey, an eligible employee is paid two-thirds of her 
average weekly wage up to the maximum amount payable, which is 
$546 as of January 1, 2009.189 The average weekly disability benefit 
is generally based on the employee’s earnings in the eight calendar 
 
 179.  Id. 
 180. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2627. 
 181. In order to qualify for disability benefits in Hawaii, the following conditions must be 
met: (a) the injury or illness must not be work-related; (b) the injury or illness must prevent 
the applicant from performing her regular job duties; and (c) the applicant must be under the 
care of a licensed physician who certifies her disability. HAW. REV. STAT. § 392-26 (2009). 
 182. Id. § 392–33(3). 
 183. Id. § 392–24. 
 184. Id. § 392–23. 
 185. Under New York’s insurance program, disability is defined as the inability of an 
employee, as a result of injury or sickness not arising out of and in the course of an 
employment, to perform the regular duties of her employment or the duties of any other 
employment that her employer may offer her at her regular wages and that her injury or 
sickness does not prevent her from performing. N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 201(A) 
(McKinney 2010). 
 186. Id. § 204. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. § 205. 
 189. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21–3 (2009); see also DEP’T. OF LABOR, SUMMARY OF STATE 
DISABILITY BENEFITS, available at http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/uilawcompar/ 
2009/disability.pdf. 
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weeks immediately preceding the week in which the disability begins. 
The maximum benefit amount that may be paid for each period of 
disability is one-third (1/3) of the total wages the claimant earned in 
New Jersey covered employment during the base year, or twenty-six 
times the weekly benefit amount, whichever is less. The first seven 
days of disability are called the waiting week, meaning benefits are 
payable on the eighth consecutive day of disability.190  
Finally, Rhode Island’s disability insurance191 provides a weekly 
benefit rate that is equal to not more than 85% of the wages paid to 
the employee in the highest earning quarter of her base period.192 As 
of July 1, 2009, the minimum weekly benefit rate is $69.00 and 
$694.00 is the maximum benefit rate.193 The maximum benefit 
period is thirty weeks.194 Generally, a worker must have been paid at 
least $8,880.00 in either their base period or an alternate base period  
in order to qualify for benefits.195 In addition, an applicant must 
serve a one-week waiting period. 
 
 
 190. If the worker’s disability continues for three consecutive weeks, then she will receive 
benefits for the waiting week. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21–38 (West 2011). In addition to 
meeting the requirements for a covered disability, a claimant must have worked at least twenty 
calendar weeks in what is considered covered New Jersey employment in which she earned 
$143 or more (called “base weeks”), or have earned $7200 or more in such employment 
during the “base year” period. The “base year” is the fifty-two weeks immediately before the 
week in which the disability began. Only covered wages earned during the base year period can 
be used in determining a claim. Id. § 43:21–41. 
 191. To be medically eligible for RITDI benefits, a Qualified Healthcare Provider 
(“QHP”) must certify that the worker is disabled, meaning unable to perform her customary 
job by reason of a physical or mental condition or pregnancy. Under the statute, midwives, 
nurse practitioners, physicians, physician assistants, psychiatric clinical nurse specialists, licensed 
clinical social workers (“LCSWs”), and licensed independent clinical social workers 
(“LICSWs”) are QHPs. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28–39–2(20) (2010), available at 
http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/TITLE28/28-39/28-39-2.HTM. 
 192. The base period is the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters before 
the starting date of a new claim. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28–39–2. The alternate base period is the 
last four completed calendar quarters before the starting date of the disability claim. Id. § 28–
41–12 (rule 3.3). 
 193. New Maximum Benefit Rates, R.I. DEP’T OF LABOR AND TRAINING (June 15, 
2009), http://www.dlt.state.ri.us/News_Releases/NR_061509.htm. This amount does not 
include the dependency allowance. Rhode Island’s program is the only state disability program 
that provides an additional allowance if the disabled worker has children less than eighteen 
years of age. The dependency allowance is limited to five dependents and is equal to the 
greater of $15 or 5% of the worker’s benefit rate per child. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28–41–5(b). 
 194. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28–41–7. 
 195. Id. § 28–41–11. 
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B. Blueprint for New State Mandated Disability Plans: An Ideal 
Solution 
As illuminated in the previous Part, there is a wide variety among 
the existing state-mandated disability insurance schemes ranging 
from funding to benefits. Thus, this Part offers a blueprint of the 
best design elements from the existing plans as a guide for states 
implementing state-mandated disability insurance in the future. As a 
starting point, state-mandated disability insurance should accomplish 
three goals: (1) provide coverage with reasonable eligibility 
requirements so that all workers will be protected against disability 
losses; (2) provide adequate benefits so that that the disabled worker 
will be able to pay for basic necessities; and (3) distribute the cost of 
insurance in a fair and efficient manner.196 State-mandated disability 
insurance is preferable to a concerted effort to incentivize more 
private employers to offer disability insurance because it ensures that 
all workers will be covered, and because it eliminates the adverse 
selection problem.197 
1. Coverage 
In contrast to many of the existing disability models, any state 
considering adopting a disability insurance scheme should extend 
eligibility to cover all workers.198 All workers are at risk of a 
disability-induced bankruptcy and should receive protection from 
wage interruption as a result of a disability. Therefore, it follows that 
the definition of disability should be sufficiently broad to cover 
almost all instances of disabilities resulting from a non-work-related 
injury or illness. Disability should be defined as the inability to 
perform the regular duties of employment at her most recent job due 
 
 196. See Comment, Insurance Against Temporary Disability: A Blueprint for State Action, 
60 YALE L.J. 647 (1951). 
 197. See supra note 102 (discussing adverse selection as a reason why insurers have not 
made a marketing push for disability insurance). State-mandated disability insurance also 
significantly increases moral hazard if the benefit levels are set to provide only for basic 
necessities and are limited in duration. 
 198. California’s program does not cover railroad workers, non-profit agency employees, 
and some government employees. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2653 (2009). New York’s 
program does not cover government, railroad, maritime, and farm laborers. In addition, 
professional employees of nonprofit organizations are not covered. N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. 
LAW § 201 (McKinney 2006). 
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to a physical or mental disability or illness.199 In addition, the waiting 
period for benefits should be no more than a week. 
2. Funding 
Although some states use only employee-funded payroll taxes,200 
it is preferable for employers to shoulder the burden, in addition to 
the employees, for a number of reasons. First, employer 
contributions provide an additional revenue stream. With the high 
unemployment rate, states that rely solely on employee contributions 
are particularly vulnerable to revenue shortfalls. For example, with 
California’s unemployment rate hovering around 12%,201 some have 
estimated that unless California raises the rates that employees pay 
into the disability fund, the system could soon go bankrupt.202 
Second, employers derive a benefit from state-mandated disability 
insurance. Having wage replacement reduces the stress that is often 
associated with a disability. Less stress speeds up recovery time, 
which will reduce absenteeism and benefit the employer’s bottom 
line. Third, the employer receives some reciprocal benefits associated 
with the employee’s ability to maintain some level of consumption 
while avoiding bankruptcy. Employees, who are provided with wage 
replacement through disability insurance, retain their ability to buy 
essential goods and continue to consume. Because consumption  
drives the economy, enabling families to have adequate resources to 
consume basic necessities is a positive benefit for everyone. 
Although it is equitable to ask employers and employees to 
contribute, the tax rate should not be unduly burdensome. 
 
 199. Advocates for paid family leave have targeted state mandated disability insurance as a 
way of achieving their goals. See, e.g., Katherine Ulrich, Insuring Family Risks: Suggestions for a 
National Family Policy and Wage Replacement, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 45 (2002) 
(noting that temporary disability insurance programs may be expanded to include family risks); 
see also NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, THE CASE FOR PAID FAMILY LEAVE (2011),  
available at http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/DocServer/PFML_The_Case_ 
FINAL.pdf? docID=7848 (highlighting the fact that New Jersey and California successfully 
integrated paid family leave into their existing temporary disability insurance programs). 
 200. Both California and Rhode Island fund their plans exclusively through employee 
payroll deductions. See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text. 
 201. See Timothy Homan, U.S. Jobless Rate Falls to 8.9%, California Dips, SAN 
FRANCISCO CHRON., Mar. 5, 2011, at D1 (noting that California’s unemployment rate dipped 
slightly to 12.4%). 
 202. Greg Lucas, Davis Says No Boost in Disability Deduction: Governor Defies Warnings 
on Health of State Fund, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Jan. 27, 2000, at A3 (noting that employee 
contribution rates have steadily risen). 
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Therefore, the ideal rate of tax is probably 0.5% of wages for both 
the employee and the employer. Currently, all the states cap the 
amount of income that is subject to the disability insurance payroll 
deduction. Low income caps jeopardize continued viability of the 
plans and prevent some state’s plans, like New York,203 from 
providing sufficient wage replacement. Thus, the 0.5% payroll 
deduction, like the Medicare tax, should not be subject to a 
contribution limit or cap.204 
3. Plan administration 
The states mandating disability insurance organize the 
administration of the plans in one of two ways. First, some states 
have created a state fund with the payroll contributions and pay all 
benefits out of the state fund.205 Other states have implemented a 
“play-or-pay” strategy. Under this approach, the states create a fund 
and allow employers to opt out of the state fund in order to self-
insure or purchase a private plan.206 Eliminating private insurers and 
relying exclusively on the state to administer the plan ultimately is 
the best option for two important reasons. 
First, state administration allows the state greater control in 
ensuring that claims are processed properly.207 Although some will 
argue that state administration leads to waste and is inefficient, 
reports of abuse are still more easily correctable if the state maintains 
control. For instance, California’s temporary disability insurance plan 
has received negative press for improperly processing claims, which 
 
 203. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 204. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 15: EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE 
(2011). The 2011 employee tax rate for Medicare is 1.45% (amount withheld). The 2011 
employer tax rate for Medicare tax is also 1.45% (2.9% total). There is no wage base limit for 
Medicare tax; all covered wages are subject to Medicare tax. Id. 
 205. The Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training manages the fund into which 
the employee contributions are paid and disability payments are paid out of. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 
28–39–10 (2010). 
 206. In addition to approval from the state, New Jersey requires employee approval of a 
private plan if employee contributions will be required for funding. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21–
32 (2010). California law requires that private plans provide benefits greater than those under 
the State plan in all respects. CAL.  INS. CODE § 3254 (2006). 
 207. California fined Unum, the nation’s largest disability insurer, $8,000,000 and 
required that the company reopen as many as 26,000 cases because, inter alia, the company 
knowingly applied the wrong legal definition of “disability” in denying claims. See Victoria 
Colliver, Insurer Deal Is Industry Changer: Settlement Sets New Standards for Disability Claims, 
SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., October 4, 2005, at C–1. 
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contributed to millions in losses for the plan.208 The same report 
found that the percentage of paperwork mistakes made by state 
employees was 39% in 2001 and 27.5% in 2002.209 Further, 
utilization of a private insurer does not ensure that claims will be 
properly administered. Unum, the largest disability insurer in the 
country, was fined $8 million and ordered to reassess over 26,000 
cases of disability that were denied in bad faith.210 The state has a 
vested interest in ensuring that its citizens are treated fairly and 
receive disability benefits. Therefore, the state should undertake 
administration of claims and periodic reviews of its efficiency. 
Second, the mandate to buy private health insurance has been a 
point of contention with the PPACA even with the existence of 
precedent for Congress and state legislatures to channel the spending 
of private resources toward certain public objectives such as 
COBRA,211 HIPAA,212 the Women’s Health and Cancer Rights 
Act,213 and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.214 There is no reason 
 
 208. See, e.g., Robert Salladay, Disability Plan Loses Millions: State Insurance Program’s 
Costs Skyrocket Through Errors, Abuse, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Jan 26, 2003, at A1. 
(reporting that in 1999 and 2000 SDI overpaid between $124 million and $200 million in 
benefits to workers who may not have been disabled) [hereinafter Salladay, Disabiltiy Plan 
Loses Millions]; Robert Salladay, Chief of State Disability Program Quits Under Fire, Takes New 
Post with Probe Ahead, She Goes to Health Agency. SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Feb. 5, 2003, at 
A1. 
 209. See Salladay, Disability Plan Loses Millions, supra note 208. 
 210. See Colliver, supra note 207. 
 211. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) amended 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and provides certain former 
employees, retirees, spouses, former spouses, and dependent children the right to temporary 
continuation of health coverage at group rates. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(2)(A)(i) (2006). This 
coverage, however, is only available when coverage is lost due to certain specific qualifying 
events. Id. Group health coverage for COBRA participants is usually more expensive than 
health coverage for active employees, since usually the employer pays a part of the premium for 
active employees while COBRA participants generally pay the entire premium themselves. Id. 
 212. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) more 
directly prohibits employers from imposing rules of employee plan eligibility that restrict access 
based on, inter alia, health status, medical condition, prior claims experience, or even a 
preexisting condition. Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 
300gg–1(a)(1)). 
 213. The Women’s Health and Cancer Rights Act of 1998 (“WHCRA”) applies to 
persons covered under group and individual health plans, and it requires these insurers to cover 
breast reconstruction in connection with mastectomies. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185b(a) (West 2011). 
Thus, to the extent that a health plan covers mastectomies, the reconstruction of the affected 
breast, surgery and reconstruction of the other breast (for symmetry purposes), prostheses, and 
treatment for possible mastectomy complications must also be covered. Id. 
 214. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act that protects women was passed in 1978 and 
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to believe that a similar mandate in the disability context would not 
meet similar resistance.215 Further, both California and Rhode Island 
have managed to administer their plans for over fifty years. 216 Thus, 
other states are likely capable of doing so as well. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Medical bankruptcies are an unfortunate byproduct of the rising 
cost of health care and lost wages. Congress has focused on health 
care reform as a panacea for medical bankruptcies. Because a large 
percentage of debtors and homeowners on the brink of foreclosure 
and bankruptcy report that an illness and lost wages led to their 
financial troubles, it is prudent to expand the safety nets available to 
individuals in this predicament. Recent proposals to expand health 
insurance coverage will not prevent families from suffering a financial 
collapse in the wake of a medical crisis. 
Disability insurance provides wage replacement to workers who 
have a non-job related illness or injury. However, many workers do 
not have affordable access to this type of insurance. Expanding state-
mandated short-term disability programs is a necessary component of 
any attempt to solve the medical bankruptcy imbroglio. States that 
have mandated disability insurance for workers on average have 
lower per capita bankruptcy rates. Thus, the data suggests that 
mandating disability insurance for employees is an effective remedy 
to the medical bankruptcy imbroglio. 
 
 
mandates that any health insurance provided by an employer must cover expenses for 
pregnancy-related conditions on the same basis as costs for other medical conditions. 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
 215. See supra note 133 (discussing the litigation that has grown out of the enactment of 
the PPACA). 
 216. The costs associated with administering disability insurance programs are not 
tremendous. For the 2004–2005 fiscal years, California allocated $6.9 million of its budget for 
the operation costs of the SDI program. In that year, $3,314,511,122 in claims was paid out. 
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA, GOVERNOR’S BUDGET 2004–2005, LWD 4 
(2004), available at http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/osp/GovernorsBudget05/pdf/ 
lwd.pdf. 
